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Studies of land tenure in Afiica have mainly focused on access to and use of
land for agricultural purposes, and, to a lesser extent, on access to land for sett-
lers. Land tenure has often been regarded as a hobby for legal anthropologists
who - using in-depth, detailed village surveys - studied the relationships
between kinship, marriage and management of land. This relative lack of
interest in land tenure problems, particularly from the side of donor agencies,
was due among other things to a conviction that in Africa (contrary to Asia and
Latin America) land scarcity did not exist. In addition, underestimation of the
complexity of tenurial Systems with respect to land and related natural re-
sources has been widespread.
In the past 10 to 15 years, many development projects in rural areas of Africa
have clearly failed. The problems of these projects were primarily the result of:
insufficient knowledge of local land tenure Systems. As a result, the ability of
such Systems to adequately meet the changing local environment was over-
estimated; and, at the same time, not enough attention was given to the existing
dynamics of various local authority and management Systems;
the rôle of the African government, which regarded land as state property but
was rarely capable of actually enforcing land management;
dégradation of natural resources. Due to many factors (drought, population in-
crease, increased numbers of livestock, extensive agriculture, growing demand
for fuel, and inadequate management) the environment in Africa has deterio-
rated. This is sévère enough to jeopardize the chances of survival of large parts
of the population: suitable agricultural land is becoming scarce and the quality
of other natural resources, including pastures, water and forest is rapidly
decreasing;
increasing conflicts with respect to land and natural resources, stemming from
increased compétition.
These factors have increased awareness among development organizations that
thorough knowledge of local land tenure Systems is required in designing and
implementing projects. Land tenure should be placed within a wider context. It
is no longer enough to understand local land tenure Systems only as they relate
to agricultural activities. If the quality of the environment (including the quality
of agricultural land) is to be improved, an integrated approach must be adopted,
including access to and management of cattle pastures; access to and manage-
ment of water (for consumption, cattle, horticulture, irrigation, fisheries);
access to and management of trees and forests.
Access to land and other natural resources is not only determined by législa-
tion, but also by power relations; socioeconomic and political power relations
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largely détermine whether and when a person will have access to any of these
natural resources; and if so, what use he/she may make of them. Since socio-
economic and political relations are rapidly changing in Africa, so are rights to
land and other natural resources.
As noted, the rôle of the government in managing these natural resources is
of crucial importance. Currently a major issue is who should bear ultimate
responsibility for their management. Alternatives include: füll responsibility for
the government (nationalization); privatization; or a compromise between these
two options. For a long time, the first two options were the only ones consider-
ed. Property - whether private or owned by the state - was regarded as the
most efficiënt institutional form for resource management and environmental
protection. The unworkability of this unilateral approach has been
demonstrated by frequent multidisciplinary research, initiated primarily by the
Land Tenure Center (LTC) at the University of Wisconsin in Madison (USA), and
the Association pour la Promotion de Recherches et Etudes Foncières en
Afrique (APREFA) in Paris.2
Partly due to this research, Sahelian governments - facing dramatic problems
of land, natural resources and environment - became increasingly aware that
solutions must be sought first among local communities. Thèse communities, in
association with government at local and national levais, should be responsible
for land and natural resource management. A first step in that direction was
taken during the Rencontre de Ségou in 1989, organized by the Comité Inter-
Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS) and thé Club du Sahel.
During this régional conférence, représentatives of donor agencies, Sahelian
governments and rural organizations frankly discussed thé interrelationships
between such thèmes as land tenure, management of natural resources, and
decentralization, placing them on thé political agenda. In this article, I will
discuss some of these topics - recent land tenure and environmental manage-
ment developments - as they hâve occurred in Mali.
Mali (see map) was selected as a case study because I had carried out a number
of consultantes there in 1991 and 1992, related to thé légal and institutional
conditions needed to implement a ne w tenure policy. Developments in Mali
may in some respects be regarded as représentative of those in the Sahel région,
but at the same time they are unique, as they are taking place within a spécifie
context of significant political changes. During Président Moussa Traore's long-
term of office (1968-1991), political discussion of land tenure and environ-
mental issues was more or less taboo. After the coup in March 1991 a transi-
tional government was installed, which expressed an interest in thèse problems.
This paved thé way for frank discussions. The degree of openness and dynam-
ism in thé approach to thèse problems (which took thé form of almost revolu-
tionary recommendations for future policies) seems to be decreasing, following
the appointment of the newly elected government in 1992.
Mak' covers an area of 1,240,000 km2. There are substantial ecological différ-
ences between régions. The northern half of the country belongs to the Sahara,
while thé south has a Sudanian climate. Average annual précipitation ranges
from less than 400 mm to over 1,000 mm in north and south, respectively. The
numerous population groups in Mali hâve différent traditions regarding pro-
duction Systems and tenurial rights. The most important économie activities of
thé well over 7.5 million inhabitants are rain-dependent and irrigated agricul-
ture and animal husbandry; horticulture is also emerging. Two major drought
periods in past decades, plus sévère érosion, decreasing végétation cover,
extensive agriculture, population growth (causing a substantial run on land), as
well as poor government policies, hâve resulted in an alarming lack of fertile
land. This poses an increasing threat to thé already fragile natural environment.
Section 1, below, présents a brief historical summary of the policies folio wed
in Mali with respect to decentralization, land tenure and management of natural
resources, until the beginning of the 1990s. A description of events taking place
between 1990 and 1992 follows. Thèse events led to a change in policy: in offi-
ciai statements, land policy and environmental management are now invariably
linked with decentralization. In Section 2, a number of constraints with respect
to législation and administration are discussed, followed by suggestions for an
improved local management régime. While légal reforms are required with
respect to land, natural resources and administration, this cannot be regarded as
thé sole condition required for better environmental management. On thé one
hand, politicians at national and local levels must be willing to actually transfer
responsibilities to local communities; at the same time, managerial capacity at
local level must be strengthened. The political context of a country in the form
of a democratie constitutional state, in which local producers are able to play
their rôle as an électorale, appears to be of gréât importance.
Decentralization and tenurial Systems
Administrative policy in Mali
Until the beginning of the 1990s, administration and tenure policy developed
separately in Mali. They are therefore discussed separately hère. Although thé
pré-colonial era will not be the focus of attention, it seems worth pointing out
that Mali is made up of the ancient empires of Mali, Songhai and Ghana and
that this historical period was one of relatively decentralized political units
(Potholm, 1991; Bagayoko, 1987). In the colonial era, a strong centralized
government was introduced in all French colonies. After independence, this
was continued by the Malian government, without any modification whatso-
ever. It was not until 1977 that administrative reforms led to a form of decen-
trajization, which was in fact simply déconcentration. These reforms resulted in
the récognition of rural communities as administrative units and the installation
of participative structures, in the form of Regional Development Councils and
Committees, in 1982. In 1985 this was followed by statutory provision for rural
organizations (Tons villageois) without, however, an autonomous legal status.
Until the end of the eighties Mali was a one-party state, characterized by a
strong centralized government with civil servants largely in control of the so-
ciety. Rural farmers' organizations were not considered capable of establishing
and acting on their own priorities with respect to the local environment; these
organizations were regarded by the administration as merely 'intermediaries'
for the implementation of centrally formulated development programmes.3
Legal policies on land and natural resources
In the colonial era, the French attempted in various ways and at various times
to either substitute the French légal System for traditional law, or to merge the
two. For a number of reasons these attempts failed, but as a resuit Mali had a
variety of rules and régulations regarding natural resources at the time of
independence. The legal chaos increased still more in the next quarter of a
Century, as a number of colonial texts were partly maintained while - without
apparent attempts to create cohérence - various political regimes added new
texts to those already in existence. At the beginning of the eighties, it was
almost impossible to present a complete survey of existing laws with respect to
land and natural resources.
In 1986, the introduction of the Code Domanial et Foncier and the Code
Forestier brought legislative reform, including régulations related to fauna,
hunting and fishing. In 1990, a law regarding water management was finally
adopted. In 1992, these three documents constituted the legal framework for
tenure over resources in Mali. The major characteristics of this framework
include:
ownership of land, forest and water is vested in the state (the principle of
domanialite);
traditional users possess usufruct rights to land under cultivation, as long as the
state does not need these lands;
a complicated bureaucratie procedure permits cultivators to gain private
property (concession rurale);
clearly defined rights for farmers and pastoralists to fallow land, and to
traditional grazing territory are lacking;
a repressive forest code includes a permit and fine system carried out by forest
agents; and,
there is confusion regarding the responsibilities of the administrative arm of the
government and those of the judiciary system, with respect to seulement of
land conflicts.
Much existing législation focuses on the needs of the urban population. It
does not take into account the spécifie complexities of the situation for the
majority of the rural population. It also strongly disadvantages cattle breeders
in comparison to farmers (no spécifie pastoral code defining the rights of
herders exists, but there are taxes on cattle and sanctions against damage to
fields by cattle).
This Malian legal framework concerning land and natural resources is in fact
représentative of législation in the countries of the Sahel. The government
regards itself as the sole authority capable of managing land and natural re-
sources, leaving little room for local initiatives: both législation and administra-
tive regimes adhère to centralist and bureaucratie principles. For land and
natural resources, state property is the rule; individual property is the excep-
tion. Complex procedures discourage farmers - unlike civil servants, traders
and high-ranking officers, who are in a better position to obtain titles to land.
Between 1986 and 1988, only three farmers succeeded in acquiring titles to
land, against 132 others for whom agriculture is not the major source of
income. Moreover, privatization does not take into account the fact that at local
level individuals seldom possess exclusive and absolute rights. It is rather a
question of 'bundies' of rights to natural resources: a superposition of multiple
rights to land, woodlots, grazing lands and watersheds. Local societies recog-
nize particular combinations of rights, whereas these 'bundies of rights' may
differ from period to period or from season to season (Bruce, 1991, p. 1).
Consequently, législation does not fit the norms and values of the local popula-
tion. This leads to evasion, misinterpretation and misuse. As a result, current
légal régulations are almost impossible to implement.
Recent developments: towards local management of natural resources
Due to political developments between 1990 and 1992, Malian government
views on land and environmental policy changed drastically. Preceded by
social unrest and strikes, and strongly influenced by the actions of students, the
coup of 26 March 1991 put an end to 23 years of Moussa Traoré's dictatorship.
The Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple, under the leadership of
Amadi Toumani Touré, was installed as a transitional government within a
week and assigned the duty of preparing for free élections within one year.
The coup was primarily an urban phenomenon, from which rural areas feit
excluded: 'we are and will remain without a voice' (Bertrand, 1992, p. 17). How-
ever, there were also serious implications for thé rural areas, as thé new govern-
ment was prepared to seriously review policies towards natural resources. The
rôle of the new Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment, Mrs. Sy
Maimouna Ba, was décisive. She proposed making an inventory of major con-
straints on land tenure and environmental issues during the intérim year, to pro-
vide a cohérent package of policy recommendations for her successor. Within
thé new political framework, foreign donor initiatives found réceptive ground.
To express thé new political attitude, CILSS and thé Club du Sahel organized a
national workshop on land tenure issues and decentralization in November 1991.
Among thé participants were civil servants, lawyers, scientists, and représen-
tatives of development and farmers' organizations.4 Participants unanimously
stated that thé institutional and judicial Systems were thé main obstacles to
redressing environmental dégradation in Mali. Questions of land tenure are
critically important not only to thé country's agricultural policy, but particular-
ly to thé rehabilitation of its environment. Subsequently, a number of far-
reaching recommendations were made:
• the rôle of the government must be restricted to establishing a général policy
and a général législative framework;
• responsibility for natural resource management must be placed in the hands of
local institutions, governed by locally elected représentatives;
• current législation regarding administration, land tenure and natural resources
must be revised; a légal framework, a 'charte foncière' must be developed to
replace existing codes, setting out général principles for land and natural
resource management. Détails should be filled in locally; législation should be
translated into thé national languages of the country.
• research and science in général must focus on development constraints at local
level. Local initiatives must be stimulated and supported.
Some weeks later, the conclusions and recommendations of the national work-
shop were adopted by the Etats Généraux du Monde Rural,5 after which they
became the official policy programme. The fourth point was in line with a
number of ideas that had been circulatmg within the World Bank and the
French development organization CCCE (Caisse Centrale de Coopération Eco-
nomique), for some time. During the period of the transition government, these
organizations therefore commissioned feasibility studies for research program-
mes, to support the new national policy on land tenure and natural resources.6
All of these activities were regarded as signs of Mali's new political climate,
characterized by openness and the will to actually begin a process that would
lead to new, decentralized forms of land and natural resource management. In
June 1992, the newly elected government, led by Alpha Oumar Konaré, was
inaugurated.
Before addressing the political problems constraining Implementation of the
policy programme formulated by the transitional government, certain legal and
institutional issues of local management of land and natural resources will be
discussed in more genera! terras.
Legal and institutional issues: problems and reflections
Instrumentalism versus the social working of law
Malian législation - as that of most countries - takes an instrumentalist and
positivist approach, based on the idea that législation is capable of influencing
social behaviour. Law is regarded as an instrument of social change. Légis-
lation is meant to adapt the behaviour of citizens and make it consistent with
the law. This instrumentalist approach has been criticized by sociologists of
law. Griffiths (1990, pp. 5-7) has expressed three points of criticism:
• In the instrumental tradition, 'society is seen as made up of individuals bound
together by the state organization, and not essentially by anything else. The law
addresses itself to individuals and concerns itself with individual behaviour. In
reality, every kind of (inter) activity takes place within and is in first instance
regulated by a complex web of reciprocal relationships and social fields. The
state - and ils législation - usually play at most a distant and indirect rôle'.
This is applicable to discussions of management of land and natural resources
in Mali: tenurial and social relationships are indissoluble (or, as the French
would say, 'le foncier est un fait social total'). These relationships détermine
the attitude of farmers and cattle breeders - whether as organizations or indi-
viduals - with respect to land and other natural resources.
• Législation tends to assume that légal messages will reach the population
undistorted. In reality, however, there is always a process of transfer, in which
the message is distorted as it is interpreted at various levels. For example, not
only is the message that 'ownership of land, forests and water is vested in the
state' generally misinterpreted by the population, but also civil servants may
use this message as a means to abuse power, resulting in a général neglect of
natural resources.
• Further, Griffiths says, 'The state is assumed to have an effective légal mono-
poly which excludes other sources of régulation as important influences on
behaviour. The instrumental tradition looks not to compétitive sources of
régulation but to the recalcitrant self-interest or "deviant" character of the
individual as thé prime suspect in case of non-compliance'. In reality, the state
organization is but one of the many arenas in society where regulatory activi-
ties occur. Individuals are guided more by thé social and cultural standards
valid in their own local Community: 'the behavioral expectations of the state
are frequently less well known, less clear, and in any case far less pressing than
those of one or another more immediately présent source of régulation'. In
Mali today, thèse sources of régulation are not clearly recognized by the state;
this causes tension and conflicts between officiai and 'customary' law.7
If thé Malian government wants to achieve efficient management of land and
natural resources, it should recognize Mali as a pluralist society, in which the
social working of law must be taken into account. This means that current
centralist législation regarding land and natural resources should be deacti-
vated, to make room for transitional régulations. Thèse régulations should
provide scope for testing existing local norms and rules with respect to man-
agement of land and natural resources in practice, or to adopt new or modified
forms of local rural management. Transitional régulation should include basic
principles for a new policy, such as: land and natural resources are thé common
patrimony of ail Malians; management of natural resources must be based on
social justice and equity before thé law, and individual and public interests
must be balanced; and, finally, adoption of negotiated public-private contracts
between rural organizations and thé various intervening parties (state, NGOS and
private sector), setting out the rights and duties of all parties concerned. These
contracts should provide for fair redistribution of land and natural resources
among local actors, as well as specifying rules for arbitration in case of
conflicts.
Even if such a policy were to be adopted, however, a number of social factors
would still play a rôle in determining to what extent local communities would
accept the new policy. First, proper communication of légal information to rele-
vant actors is essential: this requires proper distribution, use of compréhensible
terminology, and translation into local languages. Such a communication
process must start within the government apparatus: civil servants and lawyers
are at the same time récipients, as well as disseminators, of légal information;
they communicate their personal interprétations.
With respect to farmers and pastoralists receiving légal communications,
Griffiths (1991, p. 16) says, 'It is important to keep in mind that the capacity to
receive légal communication and to interpret the message in the correct way is
very unequally distributed in society ... organizations generally have lower
information costs, have access to better media of communication, and are better
equipped to process and use légal information than individuals'. Further, he
states that 'Information about external law which differs from indigenous legal
knowledge is especially likely not to be known'. These statements are generally
applicable to the situation in Mali, where communications networks are badly
developed and the degree of literacy is extremely low.
Another important social factor determining the degree of 'pénétration' of an
external law into local society is the capacity of local actors to assess the local
situation autonomously, set priorities and form their own opinions of external
law. This capacity is of course dépendent on thé social context: the organiza-
tional capacity of thé local community, thé social status of the individuals
involved, thé degree of assertiveness with respect to bureaucracy, and, impor-
tantly, thé extent of conviction that external law will yield some benefit to the
village or thé individual.
In short, thé acceptance of new législation regarding land and natural
resources dépends more on thé motivation and situation of relevant actors than
on thé intentions of thé legislator. The introduction of new policies and légis-
lation aimed at decentralized management of land and natural resources
therefore requires thorough knowledge of thé situation at local level, including
thé changes being faced by local communities.8
Local contracts: institutional and légal conditions
Security of tenure is generally seen as one precondition for proper management
of land and natural resources. This is frequently translated purely juridically,
into a question of state versus individual property. However, although national
législation that explicitly guarantees such security is essential, other factors are
involved. In addition to légal factors, social relationships at local level resuit in
certain commitments regarding thé use of natural resources (for instance,
symbolic acts without explicit legal value). Such commitments or 'contracts'
will only be effective if they last for a time period long enough to allow users
of natural resources to benefit from their investments.
Such 'contracts' are not at ail new to Africa (a classical example is the
contrat de fumure between pastoralists and farmers). In Mali, a typical example
of an agreement is found in thé village of Dogon, in Tougoume. A donor
organization had selected Tougoume for thé construction of a well, so that a
village forest and a vegetable garden could be established. After plans had been
submitted to the village authorities, a meeting of the villagers, including
women, and the donor organization was convened. Ail aspects of the plan were
discussed in détail. As a resuit, those villagers on whose land the project was to
establish the well, forest and vegetable garden transferred their rights to the
village community in thé présence of all other villagers. (In exchange, they
were granted access to plots of land close to the well, which were the easiest to
irrigate.) The land for thé village forest, as well as for thé vegetable garden,
was scattered over the varions districts of thé village. Subsequently, thé heads
of the districts were responsible for allocation of individual plots. A manage-
ment committee, which included women, was set up to supervise strict
observance of rules covering maintenance and use of thèse plots. The villagers
agreed on an annual financial contribution to be made to this committee. Ail
villagers, and the donor organization as well, regarded thé agreement reached
at thé village meeting as a kind of contract, sufficient to protect thé rights of the
village as a whole, as well as thé rights of individual land users. In thé opinion
of thé villagers, it was neither necessary to confirm thé agreement in writing
nor to hâve it legalized by thé government administration.
This case is frequently cited as a successful example of local management.
However, it must be realized that thé example is not easily applicable to a more
complex situation. Nevertheless, it illustrâtes some éléments that may facilitate
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a management project that is limited in scope and targeted to a relatively small
groupof people;
a group that is quite socially coherent (few 'strangers' and a good level of
organization). The inhabitants of the village of Tougoume clearly regard
themselves as a cohérent group; they say they are edjeri: people sharing thé
same culture;
an authority structure (village head, heads of districts and so forth) that is
recognized by thé entire group;
thé possibility of integrating new external management rules in thé local tenure
system, without requiring drastic changes;
women's participation in décision making and management may be an addi-
tional guarantee that 'contracts' will be observed, since women are usually thé
main users of natural resources; further, they are often seen as important
observers of tradition.
In a more complex social situation such oral contracts are rarely sufficient to
guarantee thé security of ail actors. This is not merely a question of requiring
more detailed procédures and contracts. Often new local institutions will have
to be established that are better equipped to introducé innovations. The govern-
ment as well as the intervening development agencies must be more involved
in thé entire process.
Advantages ofthe contractant approach (Picciotto, 1992). Although a contrac-
tual approach can sometimes be hazardous (due to inequalities between parties
and risk of fragmentation of policy), in certain situations local management
contracts offer important advantages. For example, in thé current discussion
about improved management of land and natural resources in Sahelian coun-
tries, consensus regarding thé desirability of achieving decentralization seems
to hâve grown. While opinions with respect to actual implementation of such a
policy differ substantially, local management contracts would be one option.
Further, in certain situations thé contractual approach offers flexibility in:
thé number of parties involved. For example, this approach could make it easier
to involve thé appropriate groups, e.g. seasonal users of a natural resource, plus
local NOOS and private producer groups;
protecting 'bundles of rights' of various user groups. While property rights
(which in thé long term make land registration) establish thé rights of one
person or one group, a contract can handle situations involving 'bundles of
rights' and a variety of user groups;
duration of the contract. This is especially important; taking the rapid develop-
ments into account, for example in Mali, a contract can yet guarantee users thé
benefits of their investments, as long as they fulfil their obligations;
tailoring contract stipulations to spécifie local situations.
Additional advantages of this approach are:
certain stipulations could be used to lay down the rights and obligations of all
parties; this in contrast to thé current practice of the cahier des charges, which
generally contains a one-sided listing, covering only the obligations of local
users;
a contract can be better adapted to local conditions; in particular, it can contain
a clause creating thé possibility of, under spécifie conditions, breaking open the
contract and reopening negotiations;
• agreement of local contracts with regional and national policy can be assured
by standard incorporation of the obligation that these must fit within the local
policy plan, since this must be in accord with the framework of regional and
national policy plans.
Issues in establishing local contracts
Two key questions to be dealt with in a contractual approach are the choice of
the most suitable local authorities to be charged with management, and what
the requirements are to be for such local management contracts. Given the
variety of ecological zones, the variety of resources involved, the multiplicity
of ethnie groups and their various social Systems, the variations in existing
arrangements, and the many different forms in which local leadership is
organized, it is obviously impossible to formulate tailor-made, generally
applicable answers to both questions. Instead the attempt here will be to go
through some minimal juridical and institutional conditions, which are logical
conséquences of the preceding discussion.
Local involvement in designating an administrative unit. A major constraint on
decentralized management of natural resources is the difficulty involved in
détermination of the geographical unit over which a local institution is to have
authoritative power.9 Restriction to thé village territory (terroir villageois) may
lead to conflicts over démarcation of village boundaries, poses problems with
respect to natural resources (water, forests, grasslands) in relation to villages
and hamlets, and may exclude active participation of, for example, cattle
breeders who réside in thé village area temporarily. The geographical unit
should therefore be identified in consultation with thé local communities. This
process requires thé active participation of thèse communities in laying down
criteria for (a) démarcation of geographical units, and (b) identification of the
villages, hamlets and socioeconomic groups to be represented within local
management institutions. Further, detailed and updated maps indicating thé
most important natural resources in the vicinity must be available.
Taking time. Time is a major factor in this preparatory stage. Ample time
should be allocated for thé exchange of information between ail relevant
parties. Moreover, time is required to allow everyone to absorb thé various
proposais and alternatives.
Elaborating a local managementplan. At the end of this preparatory phase, a
provisional team made up of représentatives of the parties concerned should
draft a long-term management plan for the natural resources. This plan must be
sufficiently flexible to meet the requirements of a constantly changing situation
at local level, taking into account multiple uses of land and natural resources
and guaranteeing that the various socioeconomic groups within the Community
(including women, young people, migrants and pastoralists) will have fair
access to natural resources.
Election of a local management authority. Relevant criteria should be drafted
r™ th0 cöio^ri„t, nf piitrihle candidates for the local management team. This
must take place in collaboration with local communities. Cernea (1989, p. 39)
rightly points out that 'Communities and villages are geographical residential
units, not necessarily corporate organizations ... (but) heterogeneous population
clusters, stratified and split in factions and subgroups with fragmented socio-
economic interests'. Drafting criteria that insofar as possible guarantee equal
représentation of relevant communities and (potential) user groups is thus an
essential, but highly complex factor in the process of setting up a local author-
ity. It will be necessary to pay attention to participation of those who will be
impacted by change, or who will be important users; to assure Implementation,
respected authorities and upholders of local traditions are also especially
important. Thus, for example, participation of women and/or 'older people'
may require spécial attention. On the other hand, national political issues and
thé influence of political parties should be avoided, insofar as possible.
Officiai récognition ofthe local management authority. Local management
teams are only capable of functioning effectively if they are granted some form
of officiai récognition, specifically authorizing them to supervise thé use of
natural resources and to sanction violations. The procédures and conditions
with respect to this authoritative power must be identified. At the same time,
the form of government supervision established should be flexible and efficient.
Strengthening local managerial capacity. Enabling local management author-
ities to act as serious counterparts of the government and development agencies
is of major importance. Members of such teams should thus be well trained,
and a permanent, properly functioning information exchange system should be
implemented.
Terms and conditions
There are no Standard formulas for the content of local management contracts.
However, the genera! terms and conditions that will be needed to meet the
requirements of such contracts include:
a negotiated public-private partnership (which might include local communi-
ties, individuals, the state, and/or development agencies, among the partners).
A public-private character is essential to prevent local management from
deviating too far from or being incompatible with national policy measures.
Moreover, the aspect of negotiation between all relevant actors is essential. An
'enforced' contract will ultimately be just as ineffective as any enforced
external décision;
all parties involved must be clearly defined in each contract (criteria are given
in the preceding section);
the rights and obligations of all concerned parties must be defined explicitly.
The various partners to the contract will be more inclined to meei their
obligations if a proper balance between Investments on the one hand, and
anticipated advantages on the other, is guaranteed;
for individuals as well as groups, user rights to various natural resources must
be identified. This is particularly important where bundies of rights are
involved: even when only one resource appears to be involved, several
different activities, and thus several types of rights, may be at stake.10 In all
cases, user rights will have to be incorporated in the local management plan;
clearly, procedures will have to be established for seulement of conflicts. The
contract may assign spécifie persons or authorities to deal with such problems;
contracts should take into considération that Mali is a society in transition.
Therefore, a contract should state that after a fixed period of years (or earlier, if
there is reason to do so), terms should be reviewed, renewed, renegotiated or
reconfirmed;
finally, the language used in the contract should be clear and understandable.
The use of descriptions and définitions that are in use in the local communities
concerned is recommended, instead of trying to translate western j uridical
concepts into local languages. Further, contracts must be available in the local
languages, possibly in an auditory form, e.g. on tapes.
Politica! dimensions of improved environmental protection
Implementation of a System of local management of natural resources is a
lengthy process, requiring much creativity, flexibility and tolérance on the part
of all parties concerned. Such a process can only succeed in a politically favour-
able climate.
In defming and implementing new policies on environmental protection,
législation and institutional régulations may be useful instruments - provided
they are or can be adapted to local problems. It would be difficult indeed to
create a new policy without having législation that is well adapted and stands a
fair chance of being implemented at local level, both by civil servants and local
communities. However, législation is not the only, and perhaps not even the
most important, instrument to use in achieving better environmental protection.
Political, economie, financial and technical factors will be equally décisive.
This section focuses on the political dimensions of better environmental
protection, in view of recent major changes in Mali. Two aspects will be high-
lighted: first, problems related to rapid implementation of decentralized natural
resource management; and second, the importance of durable democracy.
Decentralization
Decentralization seems to be a 'magie word,' frequently heard in discussions of
solutions to management problems in African states. The concept is, however,
often carelessly interpreted; what is actually 'déconcentration' may be mis-
takenly called decentralization, although there is an essential différence be-
tween the two forms of administration. Decentralization involves a substantial
transfer of some government tasks to régional and local organizations. Where
there is real decentralization, these organizations become largely autonomous.
'Déconcentration' indicates assignment of tasks to lower ranking organizations,
while they remain under the control of the central government, to which they
are accountable. Many administrative reforms are 'sold' under the pretext of
decentralization, while in fact it is a matter of déconcentration, with local
institutions still subject to government control.
In the past few years the World Bank and IMF have put particular pressure on
African governments to trim their bureaucracies. The Malian government
understands development jargon, and the priorities of these donor agencies. At
national level, this has resulted in the political will needed to begin working
toward decentralized management of natural resources. However, the problems
faced by a policy of decentralization are often severely underestimated by both
donor agencies and by national governments.
There is a risk that decentralization will be limited to use by central govern-
ments to solve current financial and bureaucratie problems, by shifting more
expensive tasks and obligations to local communities. Often these communities
lack sufficient financial, human and intellectual resources to cope with the
increasingly complex situation. Time is an important factor: it should be the
willingness and abilities of the local population that détermines the pace at
which transfer of power and tasks occurs. In practice, however, the pace is now
being determined by central governments.
The degree of interest of local communities in assuming responsibility, and the
feasibility of their doing so, may vary within the country. In the norm of Mali,
for example, the Tuaregs seem quite willing to take over the management of
local natural resources. The possibility of this is questionable, however, in view
of the tense situation in the northern provinces. Armed conflicts in this area
prevent various population groups from working together and efficiently taking
over certain tasks. However, in southern Mali, where CMDT (Compagnie
Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles - a cotton-related organization),
has been actively organizing villages for more than a décade, village associa-
tions hâve become strong, self-confident organizations. They hâve a sufficient
'traditional' basis, plus a local cadre with a 'modem' attitude. Hère, village
organizations and farmers set up a trade union after thé révolution in 1991.
Initial successes, increased cotton priées, and unilatéral suspension of certain
stipulations of thé forest law (Code Forestier) point to thé ability of village
associations to eventually become a countervailing power (Marchant, 1991, pp.
72-87; Le Roy, 1992). However, even the secretary of the newly emerged
Syndicat National des Cotonniers et Vivriers (SYCOV) has admitted that thé
rural population is currently incapable of taking a hard line against the central
government's administrative apparatus.
If local communities are to assume more responsibilities, both communities
and civil servants at local level must have the political will needed to achieve
this. This is a genera! problem after a coup or change of regime: it is impossible
to immediately replace all civil servants and technicians at local level, even if
they have acquired bad habits under the old regime. The alternative is to
attempt to drastically change their attitudes towards the local Community: they
must be willing to transfer the responsibility and authority for a number of
tasks - which for a number of years they will have been performing at their
own discrétion - to locally elected authorities. This implies acceptance of an
entirely different conception of their duties. In the new situation, they will
sometimes have to be a party to locally negotiated contracts regarding develop-
ment or safeguarding of natural resources. In other cases government agents
would simply facilitate the process of identifying local resources, helping to
secure traditional arrangements among local people with respect to these
resources, and act as an arbitrator of any disputes that might arise out of those
arrangements.
In practice, however, rather than learning these new functions, civil servants
and technical agents may try to safeguard their positions, and restrict their
action to déclarations of good intentions. To overcotne this tendency, it will be
necessary to organize intensive training workshops. Civil servants will need
help in truly understanding thé necessity for change and the importance of their
new rôles. They will also need to acquire skills in negotiation, arbitration and
the légal techniques involved in drafting agreements in the local context of
practical, relevant environmental issues. Such well trained negotiator-adminis-
trators can play important rôles in the democratie process at local level. By
serving as intermediaries between local and national levels, they can support an
acceptable level of local autonomy while building democratie connections with
national institutions.
Toward a durable democracy
For local communities that are to be gradually charged with management of
local natural resources, the création and maintenance of a democratie environ-
ment is of critical importance. Even if they are given some level of autonomy,
local management authorities will only be capable of performing their tasks
well if they actually become countervailing powers, and are accepted as equal
partners in thé negotiating process. This can only be achieved if they are con-
fident that thé démocratie process is not limited to thé national level, reducing
thé population to a 'voting machine' for political parties created by and tar-
geted to thé urban population. Local communities must corne to feel that they
live in a constitutional state. Among other things, this means first that natural
resource législation should create possibilities for local solutions; second, that
future policy for rural development should be formulated in consultation with
thé rural population; and third, that thé various parties involved with natural
resource management need to be able to demand mutual accountability,
without fear of retaliation.
The far from exhaustive discussion in this chapter of thé institutional and juridi-
cal conditions required for local management of resources shows that both thé
Malian government and thé Malian population face a challenge that calls for
substantial inventiveness, creativity, patience and tolérance. The government
that came to power in 1992 has, with good reason, made the formulation of a
new policy regarding natural resource management a high priority. This has
resulted in numerous législative and administrative initiatives. Within thé
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment - which became thé Minis-
try of Rural Development and Environment in May 1992 - a Commission de
Réflexion was set up to translate thé recommendations of the Etats Généraux
du Monde Rural into législation and policy. This committee organized régional
workshops at the end of 1992 to discuss policy planning with respect to de-
centralized natural resource management. In addition, the committee devised a
draft for a Loi d'Orientation, to establish management of all natural resources.
At the same time, however, the Ministry of Finance nevertheless went ahead
with the drafting of new législation for the implementation of the current Code
Domanial et Foncier. Within that Ministry, it appears there is still some
résistance to embracing the recommendations for (among other things) radical
changes in existing land laws. The administrative reforms required for the
introduction of the promised decentralization also appear to be creating some
anxiety in sections of the national government.
The proposais made thus far are limited to changing the lowest government
level, the arrondissement, to communes, with greater authority. The communes,
however, are apt to be far too distant from local populations. Clearly, lack of
insight into possible conséquences and budgetary constraints still stand in the
way of exploring the possibilities for appointing new local authorities charged
with natural resource management. As noted above, although the Ministry of
Rural Development and Environment has given a positive response to the
revolutionary spirit of the transitional government, it faces opposition from
other ministries. Further political developments must be awaited to see whether
the transitional period becomes a bridge to the future or simply an interesting
intermezzo.
Notes
1. The author would like to thank Marianne N. Bloch, University of Wisconsin, Madison, for
giving comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript.
2. Among the many of the LTC studies are: Lawry, 1989; Barrows and Roth, 1989; Bruce
and Fortmann, 1989. The theoretical studies of APREFA can be found in: Le Bris, Le Roy
and Leimdorfer, 1982; Crousse, Le Bris and Le Roy, 1986; and Le Bris, Le Roy and
Mathieu, 1991. See further, for a critique of the property rights school: Platteau, 1991; and
for a critique of thé myth regarding thé theory of thé tragedy of thé commons, Bromley
and Cernea, 1989.
3. A detailed study of decentralization in Mali is given in Etudes sur la Décentralisation au
Sahel, 1991.
4. Atelier sur la problématique foncière et la décentralisation, Bamako, 25-28 November
1991.
5. Following thé national conference in August 1991, a number of Etats Généraux were
organized in thé second half of 1991 for several policy matters: trade and industry,
transport and rural areas.
6. See Coulibaly and Hesseling, 1992, and Kintz, 1992. In 1992, thé CCCE changed its name
into Caisse Française pour le Développement (CFD).
7. The notion of 'customary law' poses analytic and methodological questions, because it is
associated with a centuries-old, unchangeable, and monolithic block of traditional rules. In
reality, it is a cultural construct with political implications, which has its own history in thé
colonial and postcolonial worlds (cf. Falk Moore, 1986, p. 15; see also the explanation of
thé réfèrent colonial in Le Bris, Le Roy and Leimdorfer, 1982, pp. 23-26).
8. The création of local monitoring facilities (observatoires du foncier), has been suggested
to observe normative, social, économie and technical developments, and so forth.
9. There have been experiments with local level management for some time in Burkina Faso.
In 1991, thé Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs Villageois (PNGTV) dropped
the word villageois, as it appeared that thé village territory was not the most suitable unit.
See Ouedraogo and Faure, 1992, and Faure, 1992. For a critique of the romantic view of
villages as homogeneous communities, see Cernea, 1989.
10. A classical example in Mali is the use oîleydi (territory) in the interior delta of the Niger
river for fishing, rice cultivation and cattle feed.
11. Ideas in this section are in part based on an internai memorandum from Sally Falk-Moore
to the Club du Sahel (1991).
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